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Abstract
In this work, we aim to answer the question- what triggers cooper-
ative behaviour in the thermodynamic limit by taking recourse to the
Public goods game. Using the idea of mapping the 1D Ising model
Hamiltonian with nearest neighbor coupling to payoffs in game the-
ory we calculate the Magnetisation of the game in the thermodynamic
limit. We see a phase transition in the thermodynamic limit of the
two player Public goods game. We observe that punishment acts as an
external field for the two player Public goods game triggering cooper-
ation or provide strategy, while cost can be a trigger for suppressing
cooperation or free riding. Finally, reward also acts as a trigger for pro-
viding while the role of inverse temperature (fluctuations in choices) is
to introduce randomness in strategic choices.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Public goods game; Ising model
1 Highlights
In the context of evolution, it is observed that cooperation among
individuals exists even when defection should be the choice for
every player. In this work, we figure out what triggers this coop-
erative behavior in the thermodynamic limit by considering Public
goods game both with and without punishment.
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In recent years there have been some attempts to explain why
individuals in a population cooperate even when defection would
be a better choice. There has been a previous attempt by Adami
and Hintze in Ref. [5] to answer this question using the Ising
model. In this work, we first point out the errors in their approach
and then give the correct approach to solve this problem using an
exact mapping to the 1D Ising model. We identify the parameters
which trigger cooperative behavior among individuals for Public
goods game both with and without punishment. We find that
reward and punishment are the strongest triggers for promoting
cooperative or provide behavior. However, in contrast, cost of the
resource acts as a suppressor of cooperation or promotes defec-
tion, i.e., free riding. Inverse temperature (fluctuation in choices)
introduces randomness in strategic choices.
2 Introduction
Game theory aims to find an equilibrium strategy where both of the players
are at the maximum benefit or the least loss. This is known as the Nash
equilibrium [1]. In games such as Prisoner’s dilemma, defection is the Nash
equilibrium for both the players. Under certain conditions like kin selection
or reciprocal altruism [10, 3] cooperation becomes the preferred choice in
the Prisoner’s dilemma game. However, in Hawk-Dove, frequently used to
model cooperation among humans, and animals, the Nash equilibrium is
for one-player to defect while the other to cooperate. In the real world,
however we see that organisms do cooperate among each other like sharing
of resources. Thus, in the thermodynamic limit cooperation is indeed a
choice in the long run otherwise the population as a whole won’t survive.
An account for connections between evolution and game theory can be found
in Ref. [4]. In this paper we try to investigate what triggers cooperation
in the thermodynamic limit of a generic two player game like Public goods
game.
2.1 Motivation
What happens in the thermodynamic limit for games like Prisoner’s dilemma,
Hawk-Dove, etc. is an outstanding problem of game theory, since it is only
in this limit that games can mimic the large populations of humans or ani-
mals. In this context and using the Ising model, Ref. [5] makes an attempt
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to analytically approach the thermodynamic limit of the two player Pris-
oner’s dilemma and three player Public goods game. However, we have
shown in a previous work [6] that this approach to the thermodynamic limit
of games has some inconsistencies. In Ref. [6], we extended the idea of
mapping the 1D Ising model Hamiltonian to the payoffs in a game [7] to
rectify the mismatch between expected outcomes and the calculated results
of Ref. [5]. In this paper we approach the thermodynamic limit using the
method of Ref. [5] for the two player Public goods game with and without
punishment and show the errors in the approach of Ref. [5]. Further, we
analytically apporach the thermodynamic limit of the public goods game
with and without punishment by using an exact mapping of the 1D Ising
model to the public goods game. We calculate the game magnetisation, i.e.,
the difference between fraction of population choosing a particular strategy
say provide over free riding in the thermodynamic limit of a Public goods
game and analyse it for triggers which lead to a phase transition or cooper-
ative behaviour. We unravel a cost dependent phase transition along with
triggers for cooperation such as reward and punishment. The most impor-
tant difference between our approach and the traditional approach is that we
tackle the problem analytically, i.e., we give a very simple analytical formula
for calculating the distribution of population depending on the strategies.
The traditional methods, see Ref. [3], are numerical and involve solving dif-
ferential equations (replicator approach) but in our approach if the payoff
matrix of the game is known then the equilibrium condition can be calcu-
lated directly. Further, the traditional methods are dynamical, i.e., involve
time. Our approach is not dynamical. The main attraction of our work is
not just what happens at the thermodynamic limit but that providers (or,
cooperators) do emerge (a finite minority of providers/cooperators exist) at
the thermodynamic limit which was previously believed not to happen and
can also be inferred from Nowak’s paper, see Ref. [3].
This paper is organized as follows- first we review 1D Ising model and
the analogy of Ref. [7] for a general two player two strategy payoff matrix
with the two spin Ising Hamiltonian. In section III, we deal with the two
player Public goods game in the thermodynamic limit. We see a mismatch
between expected outcomes and the calculated results when we approach
the problem using the method of Ref. [5]. This mismatch is resolved by
employing the procedure as adopted in Ref. [6] to tackle the thermody-
namic limit of games. In section IV, we first apply the method of Ref. [5] to
calculate the Nash equilibrium for the Public goods game with punishment
in the thermodynamic limit. As before we again see a contradiction, which
is resolved by taking recourse to the method of Ref. [6] in the thermody-
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namic limit. We observe an additional feature that cost can also act as the
external magnetic field in the same two player Public goods game in the
thermodynamic limit, we end with conclusions.
3 Connections between game theory and 1D Ising
model
The Ising model [8] consists of discrete variables that represent magnetic
dipole moments of atomic spins that can be in one of two states +1 (↑) or
1 (↓). In the 1D Ising model the spins at each site talk to their nearest
neighbors only. The Hamiltonian of the 1D Ising model for N sites is given
as-
H = −J
N∑
k=1
σkσk+1 − h
N∑
k=1
σk. (1)
Herein, h defines the external magnetic field while J denotes the exchange
interaction between spins the spins with the spins denoted as σ’s. The
partition function Z, encodes the statistical properties of a system in ther-
modynamic equilibrium. For 1D Ising model, Z is a function of temperature
and parameters such as spins, coupling between spins and the external mag-
netic field. Thus the partition function can be defined as the statistical
distribution of a system at thermal equilibrium and it follows Boltzmann
statistics. The partition function for the 1D Ising model is then-
Z =
∑
σ1
...
∑
σN
eβ(J
∑N
k=1 σiσk+1+h/2
∑N
k=1(σk+σk+1)) (2)
β = 1kBT . σk denotes the spin of the k
th site which can be either up (+1) or
down (-1). The above sum is carried out by defining the transfer matrix T
with the following elements as-
< σ|T |σ′ > = eβ(Jσσ′+h2 (σ+σ′)).
By using the completeness relation and transfer matrix, the partition func-
tion from Eq. (2) in the thermodynamic limit can be written as-
Z = eNβJ(cosh(βh)±
√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ)N . (3)
The Free energy is then F = −kBT lnZ. Free energy allows us to study
the state of equilibrium of a system. The state of equilibrium of a system
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corresponds to one that minimizes its free energy F . The relation between
the partition function Z and the Free energy F is F = −kBT lnZ or Z =
e−βF . The net magnetization is found by averaging the total magnetization
over all the allowed energy levels which is same as the partial derivative of
Free energy with respect to the external magnetic field. Magnetization for
the 1D Ising model is then-
M = − df
dh
=
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
. (4)
A plot of the Magnetization vs. external magnetic field h is shown in Fig.
1 for different β, the inverse temperature.
β=0.25
β=1.0
β=1.5
-4 -2 2 4
h
-1.0
-0.5
0.5
1.0
Magnetization
Figure 1: Magnetization vs. external magnetic field h for 1D Ising model
(J = .1)
In Ref. [7], it has been shown that the 1D Ising model Hamiltonian for two
spins and the two player payoff matrix for a particular game have a one-to-
one correspondence. We first understand the method of Ref. [7] by taking
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a general two player payoff matrix as-
U =
 s1 s2s1 x, x′ y, y′
s2 z, z
′ w,w′
 , (5)
where U(si, sj) is the payoff function with x, y, z, w as the payoffs for row
player and x′, y′, z′, w′ are the payoffs for column player, s1 and s2 denote
the choices available to the players. In our analysis we consider symmetric
games where x = x′, y = z′, z = y′ and w = w′. Thus, knowing payoff of
the row player, the column player’s payoff can be inferred. In Ref. [7] A
transformation is made via addition of a factor λ to the s1 column and µ to
the s2 column. Thus,
U =
 s1 s2s1 x+ λ y + µ
s2 z + λ w + µ
 . (6)
As shown in Appendix 7.3, the Nash equilibrium of the game, Eq. (5) re-
mains unchanged under such transformations. Following Ref. [7] and choos-
ing the transformations as λ = −x+z2 and µ = −y+w2 . The transformed
matrix becomes
U =
 s1 s2s1 x−z2 y−w2
s2
z−x
2
w−y
2
 . (7)
Since our aim is to find the Nash equilibrium in the thermodynamic limit,
we start by identifying the connection between the 1D Ising model Hamil-
tonian for two spins with the transformed payoff matrix as in Eq. (7). The
Hamiltonian in Eq. (1) for N = 2 is given as-
H = −J(σ1σ2 + σ2σ1)− h(σ1 + σ2).
The individual energies of the two spins can be inferred as-
E1 = −Jσ1σ2 − hσ1
E2 = −Jσ2σ1 − hσ2. (8)
In Ising model, the equilibrium condition implies that the energies of spins
are minimized. For symmetric coupling as in Eq. (2), the Hamiltonian H
is minimized with respect to spins σ1, σ2. This is equivalent to maximizing
−H with respect to σ1, σ2. Game theory aims to search for an equilibrium
strategy(Nash equilibrium) which can be achieved by maximizing the payoff
function U(si, sj) Eqs. (5-7) with respect to the choices si, sj . For the two
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player Ising model case this is same as maximizing −Ei, in Eq. (8) with
respect to spins σi, σj . Thus, the Ising game matrix for the row player is
(see Ref. [7] for derivation of Eq. (9)) is-
UIsing =
 s2 = +1 s2 = −1s1 = +1 J + h −J + h
s1 = −1 −J − h J − h
 . (9)
We compare the Ising game matrix Eq. (9) to the matrix elements of Eq. (7)
to determine the values of J and h. Thus,
J =
x− z + w − y
4
, h =
x− z + y − w
4
, and
therefore the game Magnetization from Eq. (4) can be written in terms of
the payoff matrix elements Eq. (5) as-
M =
sinh(β x−z+y−w4 )√
sinh2(β x−z+y−w4 ) + e
−β(x−z+w−y)
. (10)
which is identified as ”game magnetization“ in the thermodynamic limit of
the game.
In Ising model, magnetization refers to the difference between number
of spins pointing up versus the number pointing down. For games we define
a quantity akin to the magnetization called game magnetization(10) which
refers to the difference between fraction of players opting for a particular
strategy, say, Provide versus the fraction opting for Free ride in case of
Public goods game. For the Ising model, J-the exchange coupling is in
Joules, while h-applied magnetic field is also in Joules while β = 1kBT is in
units of Joule−1. In the case of games, payoffs are unit less and β is also
unit less and acts as a randomizing parameter. It should be noted that β is
the inverse temperature (1/kBT ) in Ising model. Decreasing β or increasing
temperature randomizes or makes the spins more disordered. As discussed
above, two player games have an analogy with two spin Ising Hamiltonian
where spins are analogous to strategies. Thus, decreasing β randomizes
the strategic choices available to each player which effectively implies β may
trigger either cooperation or defection depending on the other parameters of
the problem. This completes the connection of 1D Ising model to a general
two player game. In the following sections we will apply this to the Public
goods game both with and without punishment and analyze them in the
thermodynamic limit.
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4 Public goods game
The Public goods game otherwise known as the ”free rider problem” is a
social dilemma game akin to the Prisoner’s dilemma game. A ”public good”
is a perfectly shareable resource, which once produced can be utilized by all
in a community. In the two player version of the Public goods game, this
”public good” can be produced by either player alone by paying the full cost
of the service or it can be jointly produced if each pay for half of the service.
The payoffs for the cooperators (provider) and defectors (free rider)[9] are
given by-
PD = kncc/N, PC = PD − c (11)
where c is the cost of the service, k denotes the multiplication factor of the
”public good”, N denotes the number of players in the group (in the two
player Public goods game, N=2), and nc denotes the number of cooperators
in the group. Thus, the payoff matrix for the two player Public goods game
can be written (for the case when both provide- Pc = kc− c = 2r and when
both free ride-PD = 0 while when one free rides and another provides then
is kc/2 = r + c/2 for free rider and kc/2− c = r − c/2 for the provider):
U =
 provide free rideprovide 2r, 2r r − c2 , r + c2
free ride r + c2 , r − c2 0, 0
 (12)
where r > 0 and c > 0. As we can see from the payoff matrix, (freeride, freeride)
is the stable strategy or the Nash equilibrium for r < c/2. However, when
r > c/2 (provide, provide) is the Nash equilibrium. We first calculate the
game magnetization in the thermodynamic limit for this two player public
goods game using the approach of Ref. [5], bringing out the imperfections
in the approach of Ref. [5] and then do it correctly using our approach as
elucidated in section 4.2.
4.1 Connecting Ising model with Public goods game- ap-
proach of Ref. [5]
Now, we extend the approach of Ref. [5] to the two player public goods
game without punishment. As described above, in the Public goods game
the provide strategy can be written as cooperation and free ride strategy as
defection. Thus, provide strategy or cooperation is represented as spin up
(↑) and free ride strategy or defect as spin down (↓), which are represented
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as vectors, i.e., kets |C >, |D > in bra-ket notation as-
|C >=
(
1
0
)
, |D >=
(
0
1
)
. (13)
In matrix representation ket vectors are-
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
and |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
,
while bra vectors
〈0| = ( 1 0 )T and 〈1| = ( 0 1 )T ,T being transpose.
Similar to Ising model, the Hamiltonian of the system can be written
using the payoff matrix U, and the projectors P i0 = P
C = |0 >< 0|, and
P i1 = P
D = |1 >< 1|. The projectors are defined as outer products of the
bra-ket vectors as-
|0〉〈0| =
(
1
0
)(
1 0
)
=
(
1 0
0 0
)
, |1〉〈1| =
(
0
1
)(
0 1
)
=
(
0 0
0 1
)
.
The Hamiltonian is then given by-
H =
i=1∑
N
∑
m,n=0,1
UmnP
(i)
m ⊗ P (i+1)n , (14)
where 0, and 1 denote spin-up (↑), and spin-down (↓) sites and elements of
payoff matris U are:U00 = 2r, U01 = r− c/2, U10 = r+ c/2 and U11 = 0. N
denotes the total number of players. The Kronecker product of two matrices
M1 =
(
A B
C D
)
and M2 =
(
A B
C D
)
is K = M1 ⊗M2, and is given by-
K =
(
A B
C D
)
⊗
(
R S
T P
)
or,
K =
 A
(
R S
T P
)
B
(
R S
T P
)
C
(
R S
T P
)
D
(
R S
T P
)
=

AR AS BR BS
AT AP BT BP
CR CS DR DS
CT CP DT DP
 .
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We get the game magnetization in the thermodynamic limit using the ap-
proach of Ref. [5] to be-
M =
e−2βr − 1
(1 + e−2βr)
= − tanh(βr). (15)
For a detailed calculation, of the game magnetization using the approach of
Ref. [5], see Appendix 7.1. As we can see from Fig. 2, the game magneti-
β=1.0
β=2.0
β=3.0
1 2 3 4 5
r
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
Game magnetization
Figure 2: Game magnetization vs. reward r for the Public goods game for
different values of β using the method of Ref. [5]. Note that the game
magnetization is independent of c. Taking any value of c say c = 2, we
see that for r > c/2, the game magnetization is still negative which implies
that free riding is the Nash equilibrium which obviously contradicts the
solution for the two player Public goods game. Further when r = 0, the
game magnetization is 0 which again is a contradiction.
zation using approach of Ref. [5] is always negative for r > 0 which means
that free ride or defect is the Nash equilibrium in the thermodynamic limit.
However, from the payoff matrix Eq. (12), when r is less than c/2 then free
ride is the dominant strategy. However, when r is greater than c/2, then
provide or cooperation is the Nash equilibrium. So its expected that a phase
transition should occur at c/2. Further, when r = 0 from the payoff matrix
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Eq. (12), we see that the Nash equilibrium is still defect. However, with the
approach of Ref. [5] we see that at r = 0 the game magnetization is also 0
meaning that there are equal number of providers and free riders which is
again a contradiction. In the next section, we show that using our approach
to the problem the issues with the method of Ref. [5] are resolved.
4.2 Connecting Ising model with Public goods game-the cor-
rect approach
Following the calculations in section 3 and using the method of Ref. [6], we
make the correct connection of the Public goods game payoff matrix, Eq. (12)
and Ising game matrix Eq. (9). As in Eq. (6), we add λ = −x+z2 = −6r+c4
to column 1 and µ = −y+w2 = −2r−c4 to column 2 of the payoff matrix,
Eq. (12). Thus the Public goods game payoff matrix Eq. (12) reduces to-
U =
 provide free rideprovide 2r−c4 2r−c4
free ride −2r−c4 −2r−c4
 . (16)
Comparing this to the Ising game matrix Eq. (9), we have- J + h = 2r−c4
and J − h = −2r−c4 . Solving these simultaneous equations, we get- J = 0
and h = 2r−c4 . The game magnetization in the thermodynamic limit is then-
M =
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
= tanh(β
2r − c
4
). (17)
As we see in Fig. 3, there is a phase transition which occurs at r = c/2 = 2
for c = 4. For r < c/2 the game magnetization is negative, i.e., defection
or free ride is the Nash equilibrium and for r > c/2, game magnetization is
positive, i.e., the Nash equilibrium is provide strategy. β which defines the
randomness in the strategic choices available to the players has no bearing
on the critical point of the phase transition. As β → 0 the game magnetiza-
tion tends to vanish, i.e., the number of cooperators and defectors become
identical. Further, in the regime r < 2, as we decrease β from 5 to 1, almost
one-fourth of the population start cooperating. In contrast to β, the cost
(c) as in Fig. 4 has a bearing on the critical point of the phase transition.
Herein, we see increasing cost for a fixed β (β = 5) propels the critical
point to higher values of reward (r). This is because when cost of “public
good” increases with the reward remaining constant fewer players will pay
the cost. Further, when reward (r) increases keeping the cost (c) constant,
the number of cooperators increases.
11
β=1
β=3
β=5
1 2 3 4 5
r
-1.0
-0.5
0.5
1.0
Game magnetization
Figure 3: Game magnetization vs. reward r for Public goods game for
different values of β and cost c = 4. For same cost of “public good” (c), the
critical point doesn’t change.
For two player games, both the players would choose the Nash equilib-
rium strategy. A natural extension from two player case to N players would
be that all the players would go for the Nash equilibrium strategy. How-
ever, in contrast to the two player case this is not what we observe. Its true
that in the thermodynamic limit the Nash equilibrium strategy is chosen
by majority of the players but there are exceptions. For example, in Public
goods game when reward increases but is less than half of the cost of “public
good”, even when the Nash equilibrium strategy is defection but still the
number of cooperators increases. There is always a small fraction of play-
ers who choose to cooperate in the thermodynamic limit and that fraction
increases as the reward r increases. Further, we see that for the case when
cost becomes very high, there are individuals in the population who pay for
the “public good” even when defection would be the best choice. The game
magnetization we calculate is defined as the net difference in the fraction of
players opting for a particular strategy, say Provide in Public Goods game
versus the fraction opting for free riding. Both these strategic choices are
akin to phases of the Ising model. A phase transition occurs in the game
12
c=2
c=3
c=4
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
r
-1.0
-0.5
0.5
1.0
Game magnetization
Figure 4: Game magnetization vs. reward r for Public goods game for
different values of the cost c with β = 5. As the cost of “public good” (c)
increases, for the same reward more players choose to free ride or defect.
when majority of population opts to change their particular strategy, as at
r = c/2. For r < c/2, majority free ride while for r > c/2 the majority
provide.
5 Public goods game with punishment
In the Public goods game, the punishment p is introduced such that when-
ever a player defects or free rides he has an additional negative payoff given
by −p. Thus, the modified payoff matrix, from Eq. (12), is-
U =
 provide free rideprovide 2r, 2r r − c2 , r + c2 − p
free ride r + c2 − p, r − c2 −p,−p
 , (18)
where r, c, p > 0. As we can see from the payoff matrix Eq. (18), when
r > c/2− p, then cooperation or provide is the Nash equilibrium, but when
r < c/2 − p then defection or free riding is the Nash equilibrium. We first
calculate the game magnetization in the thermodynamic limit for this two
13
player Public goods game with punishment using the approach of Ref. [5],
and point out the imperfections and then do it correctly using our approach
as alluded to in sections 3 and 4.2.
5.1 Connecting Ising model and Public goods game with
punishment using approach of Ref. [5]
p=0
p=.5
p=1
1 2 3 4 5
r
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
Game magnetization
Figure 5: Game magnetization vs. reward r for the Public goods game with
punishment for different values of the cost p with β = 1 using the method
of Ref. [5]. We see that there is no phase transition. Also when increasing
the punishment p, the game magnetization becomes more negative which is
incorrect.
As described earlier, in the Public goods game provide can be written
as cooperation and free ride as defection. Similar to 1D Ising model, the
Hamiltonian of the system using the payoff matrix U , Eq. (18) and the
projectors P i0 = P
C = |0 >< 0| and P i1 = PD = |1 >< 1| is given by-
H =
i=1∑
N
∑
m,n=0,1
UmnP
(i)
m ⊗ P (i+1)n , (19)
where 0 denotes spin up (↑) and 1 denotes spin down (↓) sites with payoff
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matrix elements: U00 = 2r, U01 = r− c/2, U10 = r+ c/2− p and U11 = −p.
Similar to that shown in section 4.1, we find the game magnetization in the
thermodynamic limit using the approach of Ref. [5] to be-
M =
e−2βr − eβp
(eβp + e−2βr)
= − tanh(β(r + p/2)). (20)
As we can see from Fig. 5, the game magnetization is always negative for
r > 0 and p > 0, which means that free ride is always the Nash equilib-
rium in the thermodynamic limit. Further, when the punishment increases
higher fraction of players chooses to defect which is an incorrect conclusion.
However, when we analyze the situation, from the payoff matrix Eq. (20) if
the punishment p is such that reward r > c/2 − p then the players should
choose provide. Further, the game magnetization is independent of the cost
which is unexpected. In the next section we resolve these issues and find
the correct game magnetization.
5.2 Connecting Ising model and Public goods game with
punishment- the correct approach
Following the calculations in sections 3 and 4.2 and using the method of
Ref. [6], we make the correct connection of Public goods game with punish-
ment payoff matrix Eq. (18) and Ising game matrix Eq. (9). In our approach
as elucidated in Eq. (6), we add λ = −x+z2 = −6r+c−2p4 to column 1 and
µ = −y+w2 = −2r−c−2p4 to column 2 of the payoff matrix Eq. (18) to make
the mapping between the payoff matrix of game and 2-spin Ising game ma-
trix, Eq. (9) exact. Thus, the transformed Public goods game payoff matrix
Eq. (18) reduces to-
U =
 provide free rideprovide 2r−c+2p4 2r−c+2p4
free ride −2r−c+2p4 −2r−c+2p4
 (21)
Comparing this to the Ising game matrix- Eq. (9), we have J+h = 2r−c+2p4 ,
and J − h = −2r−c+2p4 . Solving these simultaneous equations we get- J = 0
and h = 2r−c+2p4 . Thus, the game magnetization for Public goods game
with punishment, from Eq. (10) is-
M =
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
= tanh(β
2r − c+ 2p
4
) (22)
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p=0
p=.5
p=1
1 2 3 4
r
-1.0
-0.5
0.5
1.0
Gamemagnetization
Figure 6: Game magnetization vs. the reward r for classical Public goods
game with punishment for different values of the punishment p, cost c = 4
with β = 5. As the punishment increases, for same value of reward more
players choose to provide or cooperate.
In Fig. 6 we plot game magnetization Eq. (22) versus the reward r for
different values of punishment. We see that as the punishment p increases,
considering β fixed (β = 5), the critical point for the phase transition de-
creases to a lower value of reward (r). This is because when punishment for
defecting increases, with the reward remaining constant, more players would
provide, as the penalty for defecting is high. In contrast to the cost of the
“public good”, increasing punishment for defection increases the number of
cooperators.
Similar to the Public goods game without punishment, we see that not
all players go for the Nash equilibrium strategy in the infinite player or
thermodynamic limit of Public goods game with punishment. For example,
when the punishment is low as compared to the reward, then higher fraction
of players choose to free ride or defect but there exist a finite fraction of
players who cooperate or provide, even when punishment p increases from
0 to 1, the fraction of cooperators at r = 1 increases by almost 50 %. β
has no role in determining the critical point in the phase transition although
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depending on other triggers like cost, reward or punishment changing β may
lead to an increase of cooperators in certain situations.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the connection between Ising model and game theory to
find the triggers for cooperative behavior in the Public goods game with
and without punishment. We contrasted the results from our approach with
that of Adami, Hintze’s in Ref. [5]. We unravel some inconsistencies in
the method of Ref. [5]. In the Appendix sections 7.1 and 7.2, a detailed
discussion on the errors in Adami-Hintze’s method[5] is presented. Further,
using the correct approach to the problem as dealt with in sections 3, 4.2
and 5.2, we see that in the Public goods game cost plays a non trivial role
in determining the critical point of the phase transition between providing
and free riding. The thermodynamic limit of the Public goods game both
with and without punishment shows that reward and punishment are the
strongest triggers for providing. Cost invariably suppresses cooperative or
provide while the role of β (fluctuation in choices) is to randomize strategic
choices.
7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of game magnetization for the Public goods
game without punishment using the method of Ref. [5]
Following the method of Ref. [5], the Hamiltonian is given by-
H =
i=1∑
N
∑
m,n=0,1
UmnP
(i)
m ⊗ P (i+1)n . (23)
where Umn denotes the matrix elements of the payoff matrix Eq. (12). Thus,
the partition function is
Z =
∑
x
〈x|e−βH |x〉 =
∑
m1,m2...mn
e−β(Um1m2+Um2m3 ...+Umnm1 ) = Tr(EN ),
where |x〉 = |m1m2....mn〉 is the state of the system and the ijth element of
the matrix E is e−βUij , with the E matrix given as-
E =
(
e−2βr eβ(r−
c
2
)
e−β(r+
c
2
) 1
)
. (24)
17
Using the above expression, the partition function becomes-
Z = Tr(e−βH) = Tr(EN ) = (1 + e−2βr)N . (25)
As in Ref. [5], the average value of choosing a particular strategy m is the
expectation value of P im with m being the spin at site i. Thus,
〈P im〉 =
∑
x〈x|P ime−βH |x〉
ZN
. (26)
The average value 〈PC〉 = 〈P i0〉 for spin up (↑), i.e., m = 0 or provide
strategy(C) is-
〈PC〉 =
∑
x < x|PCe−βH |x >
ZN
= N
Tr(ECEN−1)
ZN
,
where
EC =
(
e−βr e−β(r−
c
2
)
0 0
)
. (27)
Thus, Tr(ECEN−1) = Tr(EC)Tr(EN−1) = e−2βr(1 + e−2βr)N−1, implying-
〈PC〉 = e
−2βr
(1 + e−2βr)
.
Similarly, we can calculate the average value 〈PD〉 = 〈P i1〉 for spin down (↓),
i.e., m = 1 or free ride strategy(D)-
〈PD〉 =
∑
x〈x|PDe−βH |x〉
Z
= N
Tr(EDEN−1)
ZN
,
where
ED =
(
0 0
e−β(r+
c
2
) 1
)
. (28)
Thus, Tr(EDEN−1) = Tr(ED)Tr(EN−1) = (1 + e−2βr)N−1, implying-
〈PD〉 = 1
(1 + e−2βr)
.
The game magnetization M , i.e., the difference in the average fraction of
players choosing cooperation over defection using approach of Ref. [5] is
then-
M =
e−2βr − 1
(1 + e−2βr)
= − tanh(βr). (29)
A similar calculation can be done for the two player Public goods game with
punishment where we use the payoff matrix U as in Eq. (18).
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7.2 The error in Adami-Hintze’s approach, Ref. [5]-
Herein we first analyze the two player analog of Adami-Hintze’s approach
in order to expose the mistakes in their method.
Adami and Hintze’s approach
We start with a two spin system and then calculate the average payoff. The
Hamiltonian for a 2-spin system defined using the Adami-Hintze approach
is-
H =
∑
m,n=1,2
UmnP
(1)
m ⊗ P (2)n +
∑
m,n=1,2
UmnP
(2)
m ⊗ P (1)n (30)
Equation(30) is Eq. (2) of Ref. [5] for N = 2. Umn represents the elements
of the payoff matrix U for the mth row and nth column. The operator P 1m
defines the projector of site 1 with m being 1 (meaning P 11 = |0〉〈0|) or if
at site 1 again with m = 2 then ( P 12 = |1〉〈1|). Similarly P 2m signifies the
projector of site 2 with m taking values 1 or 2. m,n denote the indices
for strategies which for 1 denotes cooperation while for 2 denotes defection.
Expanding the Hamiltonian Eq. (30)-
H = U11P
(1)
1 ⊗ P (2)1 + U12P (1)1 ⊗ P (2)2 + U21P (1)2 ⊗ P (2)1 + U22P (1)2 ⊗ P (2)2
+U11P
(2)
1 ⊗ P (1)1 + U12P (2)1 ⊗ P (1)2 + U21P (2)2 ⊗ P (1)1 + U22P (2)2 ⊗ P (1)2 (31)
The state of the system can then be written as- |x〉 = |m1〉⊗|m2〉 = |m1m2〉.
|x〉 represents the tensor product of the state of each site given by mi where
i is the site indexwith mi ∈ {0, 1} . The partition function for the two spin
system then is-
Z = Tr(e−βH) =
∑
x
〈x|e−βH |x〉 =
∑
m1,m2=0,1
〈m1m2|(1− βH + (βH)
2
2!
...)|m1m2〉
= 1−
∑
m1,m2=0,1
β〈m1m2|H|m1m2〉+
∑
m1,m2=0,1
β
2!
〈m1m2|H2|m1m2〉+ ....(32)
Since P 1m = |m1〉〈m1| and P 2m = |m2〉〈m2|, we haveH|m1m2〉 = Um1m2 |m1m2〉+
Um2m1 |m2m1〉. Thus,
〈m1m2|H|m1m2〉 = Um1m2 + Um2m1 , (33)
and 〈m1m2|H2|m1m2〉 = (Um1m2 + Um2m1)〈m1m2|H|m1m2〉
= (Um1m2 + Um2m1)
2 (34)
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Therefore, from Eq. (33) we have-
Z =
∑
m1,m2=0,1
[1− β(Um1m2 + Um2m1) +
β2
2!
(Um1m2 + Um2m1)
2 + ....],
or, Z =
∑
m1,m2=0,1
e−β(Um1m2+Um2m1 ) = e−2βU11 + 2e−β(U12+U21) + e−2βU22 .(35)
In Ref. [5], the condition: U12 + U21 = U11 + U22 leads to-
Z = (e−βU11 + e−βU22)2. (36)
Now for the public goods game the payoff matrix is-
U =
 s1 s2s1 2r, 2r r − c2 , r + c2
s2 r +
c
2 , r − c2 0, 0

wherein U11 = 2r, U12 = r − c2 , U21 = r + c2 , U22 = 0 and because it’s a
symmetric game the condition U11 + U22 = U12 + U21 is satisfied. Thus, we
have
Z = (e−βU11 + e−βU22)2 = Tr(E2) = (e−βw + e−βx)2
From section 3 of our main manuscript, the energies in Ising model are
equivalent to payoffs of game theory. Thus, we try to find the average payoff
(or, the average energy). However, while energies are minimized to get the
equilibrium (point of lowest energy or ground state) the payoffs in a game
are maximized. The average payoff using Adami and Hintze’s approach then
is-
〈E〉 = −∂ lnZ
∂β
= −2∂ ln((e
−βU22 + e−βU11))
∂β
= 2
(U22e
−βU22 + U11e−βU11)
(e−βU22 + e−βU11)
.(37)
Now, in the limit β →∞, both players defect, i.e., there is no randomization
of strategies. In this limit, we should get back the results for 2 player case.
Thus imposing the limit β →∞, the payoff for each player (dividing average
〈E〉 by 2) becomes-
lim
β→∞
〈E〉 = lim
β→∞
(U22e
−βU22 + U11e−βU11)
(e−βU22 + e−βU11)
= lim
β→∞
2re−β2r
1 + e−β2r
(38)
Let’s take two cases and see whether the average payoff given via Eq. (38)
gives the correct average payoff-
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1. For r > c2 in which case the Nash equilibrium is the strategy (provide, provide).
However, from Eq. (38), we get
lim
β→∞
〈E〉 = lim
β→∞
2re−β2r
1 + e−β2r
= 0, (39)
which is the payoff of the strategy (freeride, freeride). In this case
we arrive at a wrong conclusion.
2. For r < c2 the Nash equilibrium is the strategy (freeride, freeride).
From Eq. (38), we get-
lim
β→∞
〈E〉 = lim
β→∞
2re−β2r
1 + e−β2r
= 0, (40)
which is the payoff of the strategy (freeride, freeride) which are the correct
payoffs for this case. Thus, we have shown that even in the two player case,
the approach of Ref. [5] gives incorrect average payoffs for the case r > c2
while it gives correct payoffs for r < c2 . Now let’s analyze the two player
case using our approach.
Using our approach
For two spin case the Hamiltonian from Eq. (1) of this manuscript is,
H = −J(σ1σ2 + σ2σ1)− h/2(σ1 + σ2), (41)
herein σ1 represents the spin at first site which can be either in one of two
states: up or down. Similarly, σ2 represents the spin at second site. The
partition function of this two site system is-
Z =
∑
σ1
∑
σ2
eβ(J(σ1σ2+σ2σ1)+h/2(σ1+σ2)) = eβ(2J+h)+2e−β(2J)+eβ(2J−h) (42)
For the public goods game, see Eq. (16), we get J = 0 and h = 2r−c4 . Thus,
we have Z = eβh+2+e−βh. Since the energy in Ising model is the equivalent
of the payoffs of game theory but with the caveat that instead of minimizing
the energies the payoffs are maximized. Thus, the average payoff for 2-player
case is-
〈E〉 = −∂ lnZ
∂β
= −∂ ln(e
βh + 2 + e−βh))
∂β
=
−heβh + he−βh
eβh + 2 + e−βh
(43)
However, as was mentioned in section 3 of the main manuscript, the payoffs
should be taken as −E as for game we intend to maximize the payoffs
(whereas, in solution to Ising model problem our aim is to minimize the
energies, so as to determine the ground state). Now, let’s consider the two
cases and see whether our approach gives the correct average payoff.
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1. For r > c2 we have h > 0 and the Nash equilibrium for the public
goods game is the strategy (Provide, Provide). Using our approach,
from Eq. (43), we get-
lim
β→∞
−〈E〉 = lim
β→∞
heβh − he−βh
eβh + 2 + e−βh
= h =
2r − c
4
(44)
which is the payoff of the strategy (provide, provide) of the trans-
formed payoff matrix, see Eq. (16) of the main manuscript.
2. For r < c2 we have h < 0 and the Nash equilibrium for the public
goods game is the strategy (freeride, freeride). Using our approach,
from Eq. (43), we get-
lim
β→∞
−〈E〉 = lim
β→∞
heβh − he−βh
eβh + 2 + e−βh
= −h = −2r − c
4
, (45)
which is the payoff of the strategy (freeride, freeride) of the trans-
formed payoff matrix, see Eq. (16) of the main manuscript.
Thus, our approach gives the correct payoffs corresponding to the Nash equi-
librium strategies.
Ref. [5]: C. Adami and A. Hintze, Thermodynamics of Evolutionary Games,
Phys. Rev. E 97, 062136 (2018).
An essay by P Ralegankar, Understanding Emergence of Cooperation using
tools from Thermodynamics, available at:
http://guava.physics.uiuc.edu/ nigel/courses/569/Essays Spring2018/Files/Ralegankar.pdf
also comes to similar conclusions.
7.3 Invariance of Nash equilibrium for transformed payoff
matrix, see Eq. (7)
The payoff matrix for two player public goods game can be written as-
U =
 provide freerideprovide 2r, 2r r − c2 , r + c2
freeride r + c2 , r − c2 0, 0
 . (46)
Transforming the elements of the payoff matrix by adding a factor λ to
column 1 and µ to column 2 for row player’s payoffs and adding a factor λ′
to row 1 and µ′ to row 2 for column player’s payoffs we get:
U =
 provide freerideprovide 2r + λ, 2r + λ′ r − c2 + µ, r + c2 + λ′
freeride r + c2 + λ, r − c2 + µ′ 0 + µ, 0 + µ′
 . (47)
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Making the transformations λ = λ′ = −6r+c4 and µ = µ′ = −2r−c4 such
that the mapping of the 2 players Public goods game to 2 spin Ising energy
matrix is exact as shown for general case of Eq. (7), we get-
U =
 provide free rideprovide 2r−c4 , 2r−c4 2r−c4 ,−2r−c4
free ride −2r−c4 , 2r−c4 −2r−c4 ,−2r−c4
 (48)
Our claim is that the Nash equilibrium in case of Eqs. (46), (48) is identical.
Below a simple proof of this claim using fixed point analysis is provided.
A fixed point is a point in coordinate space which maps a function to the
coordinate. In a two dimensional coordinate space, a fixed point of a function
f(x, y) is mathematically defined as (x, y) such that[10]-
f(x, y) = (x, y). (49)
From Brouwer’s fixed point theorem it is known that a 2D triangle ∆2 has
a fixed point property. This implies that any function which defines all
the points inside a 2D triangle has a fixed point (for a detailed proof of
this theorem refer to [10]). Also the probabilities for choosing a strategy,
represents points inside a square of side length 1. Thus S2,2 = (x, y) with
0 < x < 1 and 0 < y < 1, where x represents the probability of choosing
a strategy by row player and y represents the probability of choosing a
strategy by column player. It can be shown that a triangle and a square are
topologically equivalent [10], and this implies that if a triangle has a fixed
point property, so does a square. A function can be defined such that it
represents all the points inside the square. To define such a function[10],
lets consider a vector with coordinates (u1, u2) and another vector with
coordinate (v1, v2) which are given as follows-(
u1
u2
)
= A
(
y
1− y
)
, (50)
and (
v1 v2
)
=
(
x 1− x )B, (51)
where x and y are the probabilities to choose a particular strategy. A and B
denote the respective payoff matrix for row player and column player. Using
this, the fixed point function from Eq. (49) is given by
f(x, y) =
(
x+ (u1 − u2)+
1 + |u1 − u2| ,
y + (v1 − v2)+
1 + |v1 − v2|
)
, (52)
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where (u1 − u2)+ = u1−u2+|u1−u2|2 and (v1 − v2)+ = v1−v2+|v1−v2|2 . We
determine u1, u2, v1 and v2 for the payoff matrix as in Eq. (46) and then
the transformed one as in Eq. (47). For the payoff matrix Eq. (46) we get
the coordinates (ui and vi for i=1,2) as
u1 = 2ry + (r − c
2
)(1− y)
u2 = (r +
c
2
)y + 0(1− y)
v1 = 2rx+ (r − c
2
)(1− x)
v2 = (r +
c
2
)x+ 0(1− x). (53)
Now for the transformed payoff matrix as in Eq. (47) the fixed point function
is given by
f t(x, y) =
(
x+ (ut1 − ut2)+
1 + |ut1 − ut2|
,
y + (vt1 − vt2)+
1 + |vt1 − vt2|
)
. (54)
Again we determine the coordinates (uti and v
t
i for i=1,2), as
ut1 =
2r − c
4
y +
2r − c
4
(1− y)
ut2 = −
2r − c
4
y − 2r − c
4
(1− y)
vt1 =
2r − c
4
x+
2r − c
4
(1− x)
vt2 = −
2r − c
4
x− 2r − c
4
(1− x). (55)
From Eq. (53) and Eq. (55), u1 − u2 = ut1 − ut2 = r − c2 and v1 − v2 =
vt1 − vt2 = r − c2 . Thus, f t(x, y) = f(x, y) which implies that the Nash equi-
librium remains unchanged under the transformations as described before
in Eqs. (46,47).
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